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I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORY
Organizational culture as a concept has a fairly recent
origin. Though the concepts of "group norms" and "climate" have
been used by psychologists for a long time, the concept of culture
has been explicitly used only in the last decade or two (Lewin,
Lippitt, & White, 1939). Katz & Kahn in their second edition of
"The Social Psychology of Organizations" (1978) refer to roles,
norms, and values, but neither climate nor culture is presented as
explicit concepts.
One may speculate that culture as a concept was difficult
for psychometrically oriented investigators to deal with, and it
was not sufficiently powerful as an explanatory variable to
warrant the effort to develop measures. Organizational "climate,"
on the other hand, lent itself directly to observation and mea-
surement and thus has had a longer research tradition (Litwin &
Stringer, 1968; Tagiuri & Litwin, 1968; Hellriegel & Slocum, 1974;
Schneider, 1975; Jones & James, 1979; Schneide & Reichers, 1983).
For purposes of this essay I will focus primarily on the concept
of culture to highlight its more recent ascent as a variable to be
investigated, and because it subsumes the concept of climate.
In the late 1940's social psychologists interested in
Lewinian "action research" and leadership training used the
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concept of "cultural island" freely to indicate that the training
setting was in some fundamental way different from the "back home"
setting from which trainees came. We knew from the leadership
training studies of the 1940's that foremen who changed signifi-
cantly during training would revert in their attitudes once they
were back at work (Lewin, 1952; Fleishman, 1953, 1973; Bradford,
Gibb, & Benne, 1964; Schein & Bennis, 1965). But the concept of
group norms, heavily documented in the Hawthorne studies of the
1920's, seemed sufficient to explain these phenomena (Homans,
1950).
In the 1950's and 60's, the field of organizational psycho-
logy began to differentiate itself out of industrial psychology
bringing with it a greater emphasis on concepts that dealt with
larger units than work groups (Bass, 1965; Schein, 1965). And
with that emphasis came a greater need for concepts such as "sys-
tem" that could describe what could be thought of as a pattern of
norms and attitudes that cut across a whole social unit (Jaques,
1951; Likert, 1961, 1967; McGregor, 1960; Katz & Kahn, 1966).
The field of organizational psychology grew with the growth
of business and management schools, thus both freeing itself from
the limiting influence of psychometrically oriented psychology
departments and allowing itself to become increasingly influenced
by sociological and anthropological concepts and methods. Cross-
cultural psychology had, of course, existed for a long time, but
the concept of culture was only applied to organizations within a
given society more recently as more investigators interested in
organizational phenomena found themselves needing the concept to
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explain different patterns of behavior and levels of stability in
groups and organizations.
In fact, it may well be that the concept of culture will
ultimately prove more useful for the analysis of groups and orga-
nizations than total societies because of the relatively greater
homogeneity of the smaller units, and because it will be possible
to reconstruct the entire history of an organization in a manner
not possible for total societies.
What has really thrust the concept into the forefront is
the recent emphasis on trying to explain why U. S. companies do
not perform as well as some of their counterpart companies in
other societies, notably Japan. In observing the differences, it
has been noted that national culture is not a sufficient explanat-
ion. One needs concepts that permit one to differentiate between
organizations within a society, especially in relation to differ-
ent levels of effectiveness, and, for this purpose, organizational
culture has served well (Gellerman, 1963; Harrison, 1972; Handy,
1978; O'Toole, 1979; Pettigrew, 1979; Ouchi, 1981; Pascale &
Athos, 1981; Peters & Waterman, 1982; Deal & Kennedy, 1982;
Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983).
As more investigators and theoreticians have begun to
examine organizational culture, the normative thrust has been
balanced by more descriptive research and clinical inquiry to find
out what is actually going on in organizations before we rush in
to tell managers what to do about them (Louis, 1981, 1983; Martin,
1982, 1983a, 1983b; 1983c; Barley, 1983; Van Maanen & Barley,
1984; Schein, 1985a; Frost, et al, 1985).
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We have also seen in the last few years both a populariza-
tion of the concept and increasing skepticism about the clarity
and value of the concept. Most managers today use "culture"
freely to refer to anything having to do with beliefs, values,
norms, ideology, and managerial style. If a change program is to
be given emphasis and importance, or if resistance to change is
encountered, managers speak of "cultural changes" that they are
making or contemplating. Mergers and acquisitions are freely
talked about as problems of cultural congruence or blending. The
effect of all this is to confuse the field and to lead to the
suspicion that culture research is just a fad that will pass in a
few years.
At the same time, as culture literature has piled up from
various fields, serious and valid questions are beginning to be
raised about the possibility of really understanding and measuring
a concept that deals with the context in which we as researchers
are embedded. In other words, our very approaches to studying
culture and even our concepts of what is scientific and practical
vis-a-vis culture are themselves culturally determined constructs,
causing some observers of the contemporary scene to question
whether any one approach to this subject can claim to be a better
representation of reality than any other (Calas & Smircich, 1987).
The only valid stance may be one of questioning based on
the recognition that how we study abstract concepts like culture
and how we represent it in our writings is itself cultural and
constrained by our own stage of historical and cultural evolution
as a society (Van Maanen, 1988).
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We can summarize this quick overview by identifying several
different conceptual origins or research streams that today influ-
ence how we perceive the concept of organizational culture:
1) Social psychology and survey research. From this point
of view culture has been viewed as a property of groups that can
be measured by questionnaires leading to Likert type profiles
(Likert, 1967). The problem with this approach is that we do not
as yet know what the right dimensions are for measuring culture,
nor do we know whether questionnaires are capable of measuring
something as abstract as culture (Hofstede, 1980; Kilmann, 1984).
2) Empirical descriptive. Culture is viewed as a concept
for which empirical measures must be developed, even if that means
breaking down the concept to smaller units so that it can be
analyzed and measured (e. g. Wilkins, 1983;- Martin & Siehl, 1983;
Harris & Sutton, 1986; Schall, 1983). The problem with this
approach is that the wholistic nature of culture may be lost.
3) Ethnographic. Concepts and methods developed in soci-
ology and anthropology are applied to the study of organizations
in order to illuminate descriptively aspects of organizational
functioning that had previously not been observed. This approach
has been necessary to bring real understanding of what is invol-
ved, but is time consuming and expensive (Barley, 1983; Van Maanen
& Barley, 1984). Its weakness and limitation is that only a small
number of cases can be studied and these may not be representative
for purposes that other investigators may regard as crucial.
4) Historical. Though historians have rarely applied the
concept of culture to their cases, it is clearly viewed as a
II
-6-
legitimate aspect of an organization to be analyzed along with
other factors (Chandler, 1977; Dyer, 1986; Westney, 1987). The
weaknesses of the historical method are similar to those pointed
out for the ethnographic, but those are often offset by the
insights that historical and longitudinal analyses can provide.
5) Clinical descriptive. With the growth of organizational
consulting has come the opportunity to observe what is going on in
organizations in areas from which researchers have traditionally
been barred, such as the executive suite. The distillation of
empirical knowledge from such clinical experiences provides a much
needed balance to the other methods because cultural origins and
dynamics can sometimes only be observed in the power centers where
culture is created and changed by leaders and powerful managers
(Jaques, 1951; Schein, 1983, 1985a; Kets de Vries & Miller, 1984,
1986; Hirschhorn, 1987; Ott, 1989).
The problem with this method is that it does not provide
the descriptive breadth of an ethnography nor the methodological
rigor of controlled empirical work, but it is my opinion that at
this stage of the evolution of our field, clinical research is the
most appropriate basis for trying to understand the concept of
culture. Most of the material to be presented in this essay will
be based upon my own empirical research and clinical experience as
an organizational consultant. It is my belief that we need to
identify clear variables before we design more rigorous methods of
hypothesis testing, and the clinical method is better suited to
such conceptual development (Schein, 1969, 1985a, 1987a, 1987b,
1988).
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II. DEFINITION: WHAT ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IS
My definition is extrapolated from the functionalist
anthropological concept of culture because I believe that for the
present this paradigm provides the best roadmap for studying what
goes on in groups and organizations. Culture is a property of
groups, and can be thought of as the accumulated learning that a
given group has acquired during its history. The definition
emphasizes this learning aspect and also notes that culture
applies only to that portion of the accumulated learning that is
passed on to newcomers.
Thus, culture can be thought of as:
1) A pattern of basic assumptions, 2) invented, discovered,
or developed by a given group, 3) as it learns to cope with its
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, 4) that
has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore 5) is
to be taught to new members as the 6) correct way to perceive,
think, and feel in relation to those problems.
The strength and degree of integration of a culture is,
therefore, a function of the stability of the group, the length of
time the group has existed, the intensity of the group's experien-
ces of learning, the mechanisms by which the learning has taken
place, i.e. positive reinforcement or avoidance conditioning, and
the strength and clarity of the assumptions held by the founders
and leaders of the group. Notice also that the learning occurs
both with respect to external survival issues and internal inte-
gration issues, and that it covers perceptual, cognitive, and
III
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emotional responses.
Culture is thus powerful and ubiquitous, especially so
because much of what we learn in groups is "overlearned," and,
therefore, drops out of awareness until someone calls our atten-
tion to it. Thus the patterns of assumptions that I am calling
the culture are largely unconscious in day to day activity, but
can be called up into consciousness if someone raises the right
set of questions.
Once a group has learned some shared assumptions, the
resulting automatic patterns of perceiving, thinking, and behaving
provide meaning, stability, and comfort in that the anxiety that
would result from the inability to understand or predict events
around one is reduced by the shared learning (Hebb, 1954). The
strength and tenacity of culture derives in part from this anxiety
reduction function, and, indeed, one can think of some aspects of
culture as being for the group what defense mechanisms are for the
individual (Menzies, 1960; Kets de Vries and Miller, 1984; Schein,
1985b; Hirschhorn, 1987).
Culture is a property of a group. By definition, there-
fore, a total organization can have a culture if it has been a
stable group for some period of time, and every sub-group within
that organization can have a culture of its own if it has its own
stable history. Whether or not one will find a culture in any
given group, therefore, depends upon the stability of that group
and the number of significant learning experiences it has had.
The levels of culture
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My definition specifies that culture is a set of taken for
granted assumptions. Such assumptions need to be distinguished
from two other levels that are often used to describe culture as
shown in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The level of artifacts deals with what one feels, observes,
and notes with all of one's senses as one enters a new culture.
But as clear and palpable as those cues are, they are difficult to
decipher unless one asks insiders what they mean.
When we get explanations we usually elicit what I call the
level of values, usually the espoused goals, ideals, norms, stan-
dards, moral principles, and other untestable premises. This is
the level that is often tapped when we construct questionnaire
surveys of culture.
It is only if we dig beneath the surface of values by
observing behavior carefully, noting anomalies, inconsistencies,
or phenomena that remain unexplained that we elicit from the
insiders their underlying assumptions.
Such assumptions often start out historically as values,
but, as they stand the test of time, they gradually become assump-
tions and come to be taken for granted. To give an example, a
company starts out producing medium priced and medium quality
products because of the founder's belief that such a strategy will*
be successful in the marketplace. If the strategy works repeated-
ly over several generations of products, it will gradually be
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assumed that such a strategy is, in fact, correct and will cease
to be questioned. The danger for the organization then is that it
may not be able to unlearn this assumption even though the envi-
ronment may change, especially if the original learning was based
on traumatic mistakes.
The "content" of culture.
Culture is ubiquitous. It covers all areas of group life.
A content typology is always dangerous because one may not have
the right variables in it, but if one distills from the social
psychology of groups the dimensions that recur, one can identify a
set of major external and internal tasks that all groups face (see
Table 1). The group's culture can then be seen as the learned
response to each of these tasks, and any others that may arise.
Insert Table 1 about here
Underlying these tasks is a set of even more fundamental
issues with which all groups must deal, derived from comparative
studies of societies. These are shown in Table 2 along with some
preliminary dimensions that have been used in the culture litera-
ture to characterize known variations on those dimensions (Kluck-
hohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Hofstede, 1980). As we will see in a
later section, it is these dimensions that must be examined when
we hypothesize what a culture would have to be like in order to
favor organizational innovation.
__11___1__1__1_11____------------.
Table 1
The External and Internal Tasks Facing All Groups
External Adaptation Tasks
Developing consensus on:
1. The Core Mission, Manifest and Latent Functions, and Primary
Tasks of the Organization Vis-a-Vis its Environments.
2. The Specific Goals to be Pursued by the Organization.
3. The Basic Means to be Used in Accomplishing the Goals.
4. The Criteria to be Used for Measuring Results.
5. The Remedial or Repair Strategies if Goals are not Achieved.
Internal Integration Tasks
Developing Consensus on:
1. The Common Language and Conceptual System to be Used,
Including Concepts of Time and Space.
2. The Group Boundaries and Criteria for Inclusion.
3. The Criteria for the Allocation of Status, Power, Authority.
4. The Criteria for Intimacy, Friendship, and Love.
5. Criteria for the Allocation of Rewards and Punishments.
6. Concepts for Managing the Unmanageable--Ideology and Religion.
- I ofi
Table 2
Some Underlying Dimensions of Organizational Culture
1. The Organization's Relationship to its Environment: Does the
organization perceive itself to be dominant, submissive, harmoni-
zing, searching out a niche?
2. The Nature of Human Activity: Is the "correct" way for humans
to behave to be dominant pro-active, harmonizing, or passive
fatalistic?
3. The Nature of Reality and Truth: How do we define what is
true and what is not true, and how is truth ultimately determined
both in the physical and social world, by pragmatic test or
reliance on wisdom?
4. The Nature of Time: What is our basic orientation in terms of
past, present, and future, and what kinds of time units are most
relevant for the conduct of daily affairs?
5. The Nature of Human Nature: Are humans basically good,
neutral, or evil, and is human nature perfectible or fixed?
6. The Nature of Human Relationships: What is the "correct" way
for people to relate to each other, to distribute power and
1_1-__1111111___ -1_11_1_11_______--
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affection? Is life competitive or cooperative, is the best way
to organize society on the basis of individualism or groupism, is
the best authority system autocratic/paternalistic or collegial/
participative?
7. Homogeneity vs. Diversity: Is the group best off if it is
highly diverse or if it is highly homogeneous, and should
individuals in a group be encouraged to innovate or conform?
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Insert Table 2 about here
Deciphering cultural content.
Once one has specified dimensions it is tempting to jump to
measurement tools, but one needs to remember that culture exists
at different levels which will require different "measurement"
approaches. The level of artifacts is easy to observe and docu-
ment, but, as previously noted, difficult to decipher. We can go
into an organization and see things, hear things, feel things, and
smell things, but we do not necessarily know what they mean to the
insiders. The value in documenting what we see and hear is great,
however, in terms of providing clues to what may be going on under
the surface.
Most cultural studies must involve some degree of field
work and on-site observation if one is to draw valid conclusions,
but such field work can be accomplished in a variety of ways. The
clinician/consultant is often in the best position to make valid
observations because members of the organization are more likely
to reveal important data if they feel they are being helped and
are paying for the help (Schein, 1987a, 1987b) .
The things we observe that do not make sense are the best
basis for proceeding with cultural deciphering. We now need some
willing and motivated insiders who can be asked about our observa-
tions. As we inquire about the things that puzzle us, we general-
ly elicit the level of values, the reasons insiders give to ex-
plain why they do the things they do. But these reasons are more
likely to be the espoused values, the organization's ideology, not
___I_·_I I___ ____
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necessarily its underlying assumptions.
To get at those assumptions we must combine the resources
of 1) the observant outsider who raises questions with 2) the
efforts of motivated insiders who want to decipher why they do the
things they do. This pushes the deciphering process to the level
of assumptions by confronting the insider with the discrepancies
between observed behavior and espoused values.
If we combine insider knowledge with outsider questions,
assumptions can be surfaced, but the process of inquiry has to be
interactive, with the outsider continuing to probe until assumpt-
ions have really been teased out. Survey instruments or question-
naires simply cannot accomplish such deciphering because we gener-
ally do not know what to ask about and it is too easy for the
respondent just to provide the socially acceptable answer.
Furthermore, such deciphering works best when it is
directed toward identifying those cultural assumptions which aid
or hinder the accomplishment of particular organizational goals.
Since culture is ubiquitous, it is often not useful to try to
identify it in its most general sense. But if we are trying to
understand a particular organizational phenomenon, then it is
possible to focus on those aspects of the culture that may illumi-
nated that phenomenon.
Research vs. action.
If the investigator is interested in studying the culture
for scientific purposes the problem of completeness and validity
are fairly serious ones. Culture covers all of a group's learning
-13-
and is therefore a vast network of assumptions, some of which fit
together into coherent paradigms, while others are loosely coupled
and even inconsistent with each other. There is nothing in the
concept that implies integration or internal consistency.
On the other hand, if the purpose of the investigation is
to help a group to decipher those aspects of its culture that may
aid or hinder some direction that the group wants to move in, then
a speedier process of helping insiders to decipher their own
culture can be used. If one is meeting with the relevant client
group, generally a cross-section of members of the organization,
one can begin with a short lecture on what culture is and the
levels of culture. Following this I ask members in open group
discussion to identify as many of their artifacts as they can,
then move them into a discussion of values, and finally push to
underlying assumptions. This process can be completed in as
little as three to four hours because group members are able to
surface their own culture much more quickly than an outsider can
decipher it. The outsider is needed, however, to provide the
framework, to ask the right questions, and to push the group to
the level of assumptions.
The picture of the culture that emerges by means of this
process will be valid but incomplete. This lack of completeness
does not matter, however, since the purpose is to identify only
those aspects of the culture that are relevant to the group's
action agenda. The final task is then for the group to examine
the assumptions it has identified and to classify them in terms of
whether they would aid or hinder the agenda. The output of this
III
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discussion then provides the basis for deciding what, if anything,
must be done about the culture if the group is to accomplish its
goals.
III. TWO CASE EXAMPLES.
Two brief case examples will illustrate the concepts
presented thus far. In the Action Co. a visitor would note at the
level of artifacts a high degree of informality, open office land-
scape architecture, frenetic activity all around, a high degree of
confrontation, conflict, and fighting in meetings, an obvious lack
of status symbols such as parking spaces or executive dining
rooms, a sense of high energy and emotional involvement, people
staying late, etc.
If one asks about these various behaviors one is told that
the company is in a rapidly growing high technology field where
hard work, innovation, and rapid solutions to things are very
important, and where it is essential for everyone to contribute at
their maximum capacity. New employees are carefully screened and
when an employee fails, he or she is simply assigned to another
task, not fired or punished in any personal way.
If one discusses this further and pushes to the level of
assumptions one elicits a pattern or paradigm such as that shown
in Figure 2. Because of the kind of technology the company is in,
and because of the strongly held beliefs and values of the founder
of the company, it operates on several critical and coordinated
assumptions: 1) that individuals are the source of all innovation
and productivity; 2) that truth can only be determined by pitting
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fully involved individuals against each other to debate out ideas
until only one idea survives; 3) that ideas will not be implemen-
ted unless everyone who is involved in implementation has been
convinced of the validity of the idea; and 4) that the members are
one big family who will take care of each other and protect each
other, even if some members make mistakes or have bad ideas.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Once one understands this paradigm one can understand all
of the different observed artifacts such as the ability of the
organization to tolerate extremely high degrees of conflict with-
out seeming to destroy or even demotivate its employees. The
value of the cultural analysis is that it provides insight, under-
standing, and a roadmap for future action. For example, as this
company grows, some of the assumptions are proving to be disfunc-
tional and are, therefore, highlighting where the company will
experience strains and probaly will undergo cultural evolution and
change.
By way of contrast, in the Multi Co., a multi-divisional
multi-national chemical firm, one finds at the artifact level a
high degree of formality, an architecture that puts great emphasis
on privacy, a proliferation of status symbols and deference ritu-
als such as addressing people by their titles, a high degree of
politeness in group meetings, an emphasis on carefully thinking
things out and then implementing them firmly through the hierar-
chy, a formal code of dressing, working hours, and punctuality,
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and so on. One also finds a total absence of cross-divisional or
cross-functional meetings and an almost total lack of lateral
communication. Memos left in one department by me with instruct-
ions to be given to others, were almost never delivered.
The paradigm that surfaces if one works with insiders to
try to decipher what is going on can best be depicted by the
assumptions shown in Figure 3. The company is science based and
has always derived its success from its research and development
activities. It exists in a national culture that is more formal,
hierarchical, and status oriented. Where "truth" in the Action
Company is derived from debate and conflict, and where everyone
down the line is expected to think for themselves, in Multi
"truth" is derived from senior wiser heads and employees are ex-
pected to go along like good soldiers once a decision is reached.
Insert Figure 3 about here
Multi also sees itself as a family, but its concept of a
family is completely different. Whereas in Action, the family is a
kind of safety net and assurance of membership, in Multi it is an
authoritarian/paternalistic system of eliciting loyalty and com-
pliance in exchange for economic security. And the paradoxical
absence of lateral communication is explained by the deeply held
assumption that a job is a person's private turf, and that the
unsolicited providing of information to that person is an invasion
of privacy. Furthermore, it is a threat to ego and status because
to tell someone something implies that they are not aware of that
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item. Multi managers are very much on top of their jobs and pride
themselves in that. If they ask for information they get it, but
it is rarely volunteered by peers.
This cultural analysis highlights what is for Multi a po-
tential problem--its future success may depend much more on its
ability to become effective in marketing and manufacturing, yet it
still treats R & D as a sacred cow and assumes that new products
will be the key to its future success. Increasingly the company
finds itself in a world that requires rapid decision making yet
has systems and procedures that are slow and cumbersome. To be
more innovative in marketing it needs to share ideas more, yet it
undermines lateral communication.
IV. CULTURAL DYNAMICS: CREATION, EVOLUTION, AND MANAGED CHANGE
Creation and embedding.
Culture is learned, hence learning models should help us to
understand culture creation. Unfortunately, we do not really have
many good models of how groups learn, how norms, beliefs, and
assumptions are created the first time. Once they exist, we can
see clearly how leaders and powerful members embed them in group
activity, but the process of learning something that becomes
shared, is still only partially understood.
Norm formation around critical incidents. One line of
analysis comes from the study of training groups (Bion, 1959;
Bennis & Shepard, 1956; Schein, 1985a). One can see in those
groups how norms and beliefs arise around the way members respond
Ill
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to critical incidents. Something emotionally charged or anxiety
producing happens such as an attack by a member on the leader.
Because everyone witnesses it and because tension is high when an
attack occurs, the immediate next set of behaviors will very
likely create a norm.
Suppose, for example, that the leader counterattacks, that
the group members "concur" with silence or approval, and the
offending member indicates with an apology that he or she accepts
his or her "mistake." In those few moments a bit of culture has
begun to be created-- the norm, eventually to become a belief and
then an assumption, if the same pattern recurs, that "we do not
attack the leader in this group; authority is sacred."
If the leader and the group had responded differently to
attacks, a different norm and eventually assumption would have
been formed. If one wants to study the culture of an organiza-
tion, then, one way is to historically reconstruct critical inci-
dents and to document carefully the responses that occurred
immediately after each incident.
Identification with leaders. A second mechanism of culture
creation is the modelling by leader figures that permits members
to identify with them and internalize their values and assumpt-
ions. When groups or organizations first form, there are usually
dominant figures or "founders" whose own beliefs, values, and
assumptions provide a visible and articulated model for how the
group should be structured and how it should function (Schein,
1983). As these get put into practice, some work out and some do
not. The group then learns from its own experience what parts of
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the "founder" belief system work for the group as a whole. The
joint learning then gradually creates a shared assumption.
Founders and subsequent leaders continue to attempt to
embed their own assumptions but increasingly they find that other
parts of the organization have their own experience to draw on and
thus cannot be changed. If the founders are very potent, such
sub-culture formation can be overridden, but as the organization
grows and becomes differentiated, the culture increasingly comes
to reflect not only the experiences of sub-cultures but also the
beliefs and assumptions of other powerful figures in the
organization.
How do leaders embed their own beliefs? Primary embedding
mechanisms are:
1) What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control;
2) How leaders react to critical incidents and organiza-
tional crises;
3) Deliberate role modelling and coaching;
4) The stated criteria for the allocation of rewards and
status; and
5) The stated criteria for recruitment, selection, promo-
tion, retirement, and excommunication.
Secondary articulation and reinforcement mechanisms are:
1) The organization's design and structure;
2) Organizational systems and procedures;
3) The design of physical space, facades, and buildings;
4) Stories, legends, myths, and symbols; and
5) formal statements of organizational philosophy, creeds,
1 __11__111_11__1__1__---- -___
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and charters.
As cultures evolve and grow there is a tendency for the
various elements that convey culture to become congruent with each
other because of the human need for consistency, but because of
sub-culture formation it is also probable that any given culture
will contain conflicting and dissonant elements within it. Cultu-
ral assumptions are not necessarily consistent with each other.
Cultural preservation through socialization.
Culture perpetuates and reproduces itself through the
socialization of new members entering the group. As pointed out
above in the section on embedding, the socialization process
really begins with the recruitment and selection process in that
the organization is likely to look for new members who already
have the "right" set of assumptions, beliefs, and values. If the
organization can find such presocialized members it needs to do
relatively less active socialization. More typically, however,
new members do not "know the ropes" well enough to be able to take
and enact their organizational roles and thus need to be trained
and "acculturated" (Schein, 1968; Ritti & Funkhouser, 1987).
The socialization process has been analyzed from a variety
of perspectives and can best be conceptualized in terms of a set
of dimensions that allow one to study variations in how different
organizations approach the process (Van Maanen, 1978; Van Maanen &
Schein, 1979). There are seven dimensions along which socializa-
tion processes can vary:
1) Group vs. individual: The degree to which the organiza-
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tion processes recruits in batches like in boot camp or individu-
ally as in professional offices.
2) Formal vs. informal: The degree to which the process is
formalized as in set training programs or is handled informally
through apprenticeships, individual coaching by the immediate
superior, or the like.
3) Self destructive and reconstructing vs. self enhancing:
The degree to which the process destroys aspects of the self and
replaces them as in boot camp or enhances aspects of the self as
in professional development programs.
4) Serial vs. random: The degree to which role models are
provided as in apprenticeship or mentoring programs or are delibe-
rately withheld as in sink or swim kinds of initiations in which
the recruit is expected to figure out his or her own solutions.
5) Sequential vs. disjunctive: The degree to which the
process is guided through a series of discrete steps and roles or
is open-ended in that the recruit can never predict what organiza-
tional role will come next.
6) Fixed vs. variable: The degree to which stages of the
training process have fixed time tables for each stage as in mili-
tary academies, boot camps, or rotational training programs or are
open-ended as in typical promotional systems where one is not
advanced to the next stage until one is judged to be "ready."
7) Tournament vs. contest: The degree to which each stage
is an "elimination tournament" where one is out of the organiza-
tion if one fails, or a "contest" in which one builds up a track
record and "batting average."
III
-22-
Socialization consequences. Though the goal of socializa-
tion is to perpetuate the culture, it is clear that the process
does not have uniform effects. Individuals respond differently to
the same treatment, and, even more importantly, different combina-
tions of socialization tactics can be hypothesized to produce
somewhat different outcomes in the first place.
For example, from the point of view of the organization,
one can specify three kinds of outcomes: 1) A custodial orienta-
tion or total conformity to all norms and complete learning of all
assumptions; 2) Creative individualism which implies that the
trainee learns all of the central and pivotal assumptions of the
culture, but rejects all peripheral ones, permitting the individu-
al to be creative both with respect to the organization's tasks
and in how the organization performs them (role innovation); 3)
Rebellion or the total rejection of all assumptions. If the re-
bellious individual is constrained by external circumstances from
leaving the organization, he or she will subvert, sabotage, and
ultimately foment revolution (Schein, 1968, Van Maanen & Schein,
1979).
The combination of socialization techniques most likely to
produce a custodial orientation is 1) formal, 2) self-reconstruct-
ing, 3) serial, 4) sequential, 5) variable, and 6) tournament
like. Hence if one wants new members to be more creative in the
use of their talents, one should use socialization techniques that
are informal, self-enhancing, random, disjunctive, fixed in terms
of time tables, and contest-like.
The individual versus group dimension can go in either
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direction, in that group socialization methods can either produce
very loyal custodially oriented cohorts or can produce very dis-
loyal rebels if counter-cultural norms are formed during the so-
cialization process. Similarly in the individual apprenticeship,
the direction of socialization will depend very much on the
initial orientation of the mentor or coach.
Efforts to measure these socialization dimensions have been
made and some preliminary support for the above hypotheses has
been forthcoming (Feldman, 1976, 1988; Jones, 1986). Insofar as
cultural evolution is very much a function of internal innovative
and creative efforts on the part of new members, this line of
investigation is especially important.
Natural Evolution.
Every group and organization is an open system that exists
in multiple environments. Changes in the environment will produce
stresses and strains inside the group, forcing new learning and
adaptation. At the same time, as new members come into the group,
if they are not over-socialized, they will bring in new beliefs
and assumptions that will to varying degrees influence currently
held assumptions. To some degree, then, there is constant
pressure on any given culture to evolve and grow, but just as
individuals do not give up easily the elements of their identity
or their defense mechanisms, so groups do not easily give up some
of their basic underlying assumptions merely because external
events disconfirm them.
To illustrate this mechanism the case can be cited of an
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aero-space company that prided itself on its high level of trust
in employees, reflected in absence of time clocks, flexible work-
ing hours, and systems of self-monitoring and self-control. When
a number of other companies in the industry were discovered to
have overcharged its government clients, the government legislated
a system of controls for all of its contractors, forcing this
company to install time clocks and other control mechanisms that
began to erode the climate of trust that had been built up over 30
years. Some kind of evolution will be forced by this external
event.
Differentiation. As organizations grow and evolve they
divide the labor and create functional, geographical, and other
kinds of units, each of which exist in their own specific environ-
ments and thus begin to build their own sub-cultures. Differenti-
ation inevitably occurs with age and size. Once a group has many
sub-cultures, its total culture increasingly becomes a negotiated
outcome of the inter-action of its sub-groups. Differentiation
and its outcomes thus is one of the main mechanisms of natural
evolution.
Guided evolution.
One of the major roles of the field of organization devel-
opment has been to help organizations to guide the direction of
their evolution. Guided evolution 1) enhances cultural elements
that are seen to be critical to maintaining identity and effect-
iveness, 2) starts the process of unlearning around those cultural
elements that are increasingly disfunctional, and 3) starts the
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process of learning new cultural elements that will be needed for
optimal adaptation to a changing environment (Argyris & Schon,
1978; Argyris, Putnam, & Smith, 1985; Beckhard & Harris, 1987;
Hanna, 1988; Walton, 1987; Lippitt, 1982).
This process in organizations is analogous to the process
of therapy in individuals, though, of course, the actual tactics
are far more complicated when multiple clients are involved and
when some of the clients are groups and sub-systems. Furthermore,
the role of leaders, managers, employees, insider and outsider
consultants is far more complex when we are dealing with organiza-
tions in that guided evolution is a process that involves many
organization members in different subgroups.
Managed culture change.
Leaders of organizations sometimes are able to overcome
their own cultural biases and to recognize that elements of their
own organization's culture are dysfunctional for survival and
growth in a changing environment. They may feel that they do not
have the time to let evolution occur naturally, or that evolution
is heading the organization in the wrong direction. In this situ-
ation one can observe leaders doing a number of different things,
usually in combination, to produce the desired-cultural changes:
1) Unfreezing the present system by highlighting the
threats to the organization if no change occurs, and, at the same
time, encouraging the organization by showing that change is
possible and desirable;
2) Articulating and promulgating a new direction and a new
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set of assumptions that they regard as more appropriate;
3) Providing a clear and consistent role model that is
predicated on new cultural assumptions;
4) Filling key positions in the organization with new
incumbents who hold the new assumptions either because they are
hybrids or mutants of the old culture, or are brought in from the
outside;
5) Systematically rewarding the adoption of new assumptions
and punishing adherence to the old assumptions;
6) Seducing or coercing organization members into adopting
new behaviors that are more consistent with new assumptions, often
by introducing new technologies that force behavior change, for
example computers and other elements of information technology;
7) Creating visible scandals to discredit sacred cows,
exploding myths that preserve dysfunctional traditions, and in
other ways symbolically destroying the artifacts associated with
undesirable assumptions;
8) Creating new emotionally charged rituals and developing
new symbols and artifacts around the new assumptions to be em-
braced, using the embedding mechanisms previously described.
Such cultural change efforts are generally more character-
istic of "mid-life" organizations that have become complacent and
ill adapted to rapidly changing environmental conditions. The
fact that such organizations have strong subcultures aids the
change process in that one can draw the new leaders from those
subcultures that most represent the direction in which the
organization needs to go.
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In cases where organizations become extremely maladapted
one sees more severe change efforts in the form of destroying the
group that is the primary cultural carrier and reconstructing it
around new people, thereby allowing a new learning process to
occur and a new culture to form. When organizations go bankrupt
or are turned over to "turnaround managers" one often sees such
extreme measures. What is important to note about such cases is
that they invariably involve the replacement of large numbers of
people. It is not easy for individuals to give up assumptions
that have provided stability and meaning in their life.
Mergers and acquisitions.
One of the most obvious forces toward culture change is the
bringing together of two or more cultures. Unfortunately in many
mergers and acquisitions, the culture compatibility issue is not
raised until after the deal has been consummated, leading in many
cases to cultural indigestion and the eventual divestiture of
units that could not become culturally integrated. In fact, for
many organization members, culture does not have a real meaning
until they confront, often in horror, how different another
organization can be.
Melding or integration can be aided if the leadership
agrees from the outset to a systematic exchange of people across
the two cultures to permit a real exploration of commonalities and
differences. This process takes time. If a more rapid integra-
tion must be achieved, systematic workshops designed to elicit the
basic assumptions of each culture need to be carried out. Leaders
_
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from the two cultures can then examine the strengths and weaknes-
ses of each set of assumptions in the context of the overall
strategy and decide what, if anything, needs to be changed. How
the change is then to be accomplished depends very much on the
actual findings of such a workshop.
In many mergers and acquisitions the dominant company or
the joint leadership makes the decision to let the two cultures
co-exist by minimizing the degree to which either one will control
the other. One can find organizations today that are the result
of mergers that happened years ago in which two distinct cultures
are still very evident.
V. CAN CULTURE BE INNOVATIVE?
Given the degree to which culture functions to stabilize
our psychological environment and reduce the anxiety that would
result from an inability to decipher and predict events, can we
conceive of types of cultures that would be relatively more open
to evolution and managed change than others? The identification
of such characteristics becomes more and more important as we
discover an ever greater need for organizational capacity to adapt
to rapidly changing environmental conditions.
The rate of change in the technological, economic, politi-
cal, and socio-cultural environments is increasing, and organiza-
tions are, therefore, finding it more and more important to figure
out how to manage perpetual change involving genuinely innovative
thrusts--new missions, new goals, new products and services, new
ways of getting things done, and even new values and assumptions.
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Organizations will have to "learn how to learn" (Schein, 1980;
Argyris & Schon, 1978) and to become "self-designing" systems
(Weick, 1977). What kinds of organizational cultures will favor
such learning?
This question is of especial interest at the present time
because of the rapid advances that are being made in the field of
information technology (IT). There is ample evidence to suggest
that the introduction of IT into organizations not only forces
cultural assumptions out into the open, but that the potential of
IT as a strategic aid to organizations will not be fulfilled
unless, at the same time, those organizations develop (or already
possess) what I will define as "innovative cultures."
The cultural dimensions identified in Table 2 can serve as
a useful starting point for this analysis, in that one can state
for each of these dimensions where a given culture should be to
favor learning and innovation. I will state in hypothesis form
the assumptions necessary for innovative capacity and summarize
these hypotheses in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
1. Organization-environment Relationships.
HYPOTHESIS C1. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT ITS ENVIRONMENTS ARE
CONTROLLABLE, CHANGEABLE, AND MANAGEABLE.
I11
TABLE 3
CULTURAL DIMENSIONS THAT INFLUENCE INNOVATIVENESS*
1. ORGANIZATION-ENVIRONMENT RELATIONSHIP
Environment Dominant Symbiotic Org. Dominant
X
2. NATURE OF HUMAN ACTIVITY
Reactive, fatalistic Harmonizing Pro-active
X
3. NATURE OF REALITY AND TRUTH
Moralistic Authority Pragmatism
X
4. NATURE OF TIME
Past Oriented Present Oriented Near Future Oriented
X
Short Time Units Medium Time Units Long Time Units
X
5. NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE
Humans are basically evil Humans are basically good
X
Human nature is fixed Human nature is mutable
X
6. NATURE OF HUMAN RELATIONSHIPS
Groupisms Individualism
X
Authoritarian/paternalistic Collegial/Participative
X
7. SUB-CULTURE DIVERSITY/CONNECTEDNESS
Low High
X
* The X on each dimension indicates the ideal condition for high
innovativeness.
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Organizations can be distinguished by the shared assump-
tions they hold about the degree to which they dominate or are
dominated by their various environments. At one extreme we have
organizations that feel completely dependent and assume that their
existence and survival is out of their own control. They act
fatalistic and are passive in the face of environmental turbu-
lence. They accept whatever niche the environment provides. At
the other extreme we have organizations that hold the shared
assumption that their own behavior will influence the environment
and that survival and growth are a function of the extent to which
they actively are able to dominate some aspects of their environ-
ment. Implied is the further assumption that progress and
improvement are possible, a basically optimistic orientation
toward the environment.
Innovative capacity will increase to the extent that
members assume that innovation is possible and necessary, which
derives from their optimistic assumption that the environment can
be influenced. Organizations that pessimistically assume either
that they are dominated by others and/or assume that their
environments are fixed, will find it difficult to conceive of new
ideas and will find it even more difficult to marshall the energy
to try out new ideas.
2. The Nature of Human Activity.
HYPOTHESIS C2. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT THE APPROPRIATE HUMAN
_llllm_ ____________
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ACTIVITY IS TO BE PROACTIVE, ORIENTED TOWARD PROBLEM SOLVING AND
IMPROVING THINGS.
All organizations make implicit assumptions about whether
the appropriate behavior of members is to be 1) reactive, fatalis-
tic, and oriented to getting what pleasure one can out of one's
lot in life (Dionysian), 2) to be proactive, optimistic, and ori-
ented toward improving things (Promethean), or 3) to take a middle
ground of trying to harmonize and compromise between one's own
needs and whatever environmental constraints and possibilities
exist (Apollonian). As will be noted these assumptions are the
individual level counterpart to the assumptions relating the
organization to its environment.
An innovator in the midst of reactive or harmonizing people
will find it virtually impossible to get even an audience much
less a commitment to new ways of doing things. In Dionysian or
Apollonian organizations, innovators are likely to be called
whistle-blowers, boat rockers, or trouble makers, and thus to be
neutralized. And if the culture is too fatalistic it will of
course not attract or retain innovators in the first place.
One may wish to speculate whether there is an upper limit
to activity orientation. If there are too many innovators and if
the culture strongly encourages innovation will that cause other
problems that, in the end, will undermine innovation by making
life too chaotic and unpredictable? I believe not, because if too
much innovation becomes a problem, the organization will invent
and evolve processes and structures that reduce innovation to a
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tolerable level. In other words, if the organization is going out
of control, its own innovativeness will enable it to invent
mechanisms to achieve greater discipline and control.
The reverse is not true. An organization that is too
passive or fatalistic cannot invent "proactivity." It will
stagnate until it fails or is taken over by others who will
forcibly change the culture by massive replacement of people with
a different activity orientation. I am hypothesizing, therefore,
that one cannot have too much innovativeness but one can have too
much conservatism and passivity.
3. The Nature of Reality and Truth.
HYPOTHESIS C3. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT TRUTH IS TO BE ARRIVED
AT BY PRAGMATIC (VS. MORALISTIC) MEANS.
Organizations can be distinguished by the degree to which
they hold shared assumptions about how one determines whether
something is true or not. When a complex decision has to be made
involving uncertain futures and information of uncertain validity,
what criteria does the organization use to determine when it has
enough and the right kind of information to make the decision?
At one extreme one finds a heavy reliance on tradition,
dogma, the authority of moral principles, or the wisdom of elders.
At the other extreme one finds pragmatism embodied either in a
search for scientific verification or a trial and error attitude
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if formal verification is not possible or practical (England,
1975). If the decision is in a domain where verification by
physical means is not possible, pragmatism would imply that the
decision makers debate out the issues and subject each alternative
to sufficient scrutiny to determine that the one that survives can
be accepted with some measure of confidence.
In organizations dominated by dogma or authorities of
various sorts it is not only difficult to articulate new ideas but
even more difficult to get the sanction to try them out. An
exception is, of course, the situation where the innovator is the
person in authority, a situation that arises from time to time in
history but that is hard to specify as an organizational condition
or to predict. To increase the innovative capacity generally, a
positive value must be put on novelty, on breaking tradition, on
trying out new things even if they are risky, and such a value
must be supported by an underlying assumption that "the truth" is
not already known.
The pragmatic end of the continuum also implies a more
positive attitude toward trial and error, risk taking, and the
acceptance of unsuccessful efforts or failures. The more the
organization is committed to dogmas, rules, systems, and proce-
dures that become institutionalized, the harder it will be for
members to take the risks necessary for innovation to succeed.
The message in such moralistic organizations is "try new things
only if you are sure you will not break rules or fail," a pre-
scription for conservatism and playing it safe.
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4. The Nature of Time.
HYPOTHESIS C4A. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS ORIENTED TO THE NEAR FUTURE (VS.
PAST, PRESENT OR FAR FUTURE).
HYPOTHESIS C4B. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT USES MEDIUM LENGTH TIME UNITS (VS.
SHORT ONES THAT DONT ALLOW INNOVATION TO DEVELOP OR LONG ONES THAT
MAKE INNOVATION DIFFICULT TO EVALUATE).
All organizations hold implicit assumptions about the
relative importance of the past, the present, and the future, and
all organizations have implicit assumptions about the appropriate
length of time units for different kinds of tasks. Some organi-
zations measure themselves in short units such as weeks or months,
some use intermediate units such as quarters and years, and some
use longer units such as 5 or 10 year spans. All organizations
use all of these units for various different purposes, and, as
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) pointed out years ago the different
functional units of an organization such as sales and R & D will
have very different assumptions about what it means to be "on
time" and how long units of work are.
It is likely that in each organization's culture there will
be found assumptions about the "really important" time units. The
actual size of the relevant time units will vary from company to
company, so the determination of what is "past," "present," "near
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future," and "far future" must be determined for each organization
studied by getting members' consensus on these units. The size of
such time units is also influenced by the core technologies that
the organization is working with. The development of new
products, for example, takes much longer in the pharmaceutical
industry than in the consumer goods industry.
Organizations that live in the past or present will find it
difficult to place a value on novelty because they are focused on
what has worked or is working now. People with new ideas can be
dismissed easily because their ideas do not "fit" what the organi-
zation likes to think about. On the other hand, if the organiza-
tion is focused on the far future, it may be unable to launch any
innovation because it is assumed that there is always plenty of
time to try things "in the future." A near future orientation
should, therefore, be most favorable to innovation.
It is also clear that too short a time orientation will
always make innovation difficult because one can always show that
short-run costs are too high to justify continuation of the trial
and error involved in innovation. On the other hand, if the time
units are too long, some innovations that are failures will be
allowed to continue too long, the organization will lose money,
and the whole innovation process will be undermined because people
will remember how they were hurt by past innovations. The ability
of the organization to develop a sense of an optimal length of
time for an innovation thus becomes a very important determinant
of its learning capacity.
This optimal length of time will be subjectively defined in
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most organizations, and must be measured within each organization,
as indicated above. The precise length of the units is not as
important as the members' ability to recognize that giving an
innovation too little or too much time is equally destructive to
the overall innovation process.
Optimal length time units also play a role in the selling
of an innovative vision, whether that comes from leaders or from
other innovators in the organization. The vision of the future
cannot exceed the ability of members of the organization to under-
stand what is proposed, nor can it promise benefits that will only
be realized by the next generation. To be motivated to implement
something new, people have to be able to see what benefits that
will bring them within their own "lifetime."
As Jaques has argued (1976, 1982) the length of time over
which organization members have "discretion" appears to vary with
organizational rank. On the shop floor supervisors check on
employees by the hour or the day. At lower managerial levels one
has discretion over weeks, and so on up the ladder until the most
senior management is supposed to define its tasks in terms of
years. In communicating the future impact of proposed innova-
tions it becomes critical then to consider over what time units
the audience is used to thinking. "Optimal"_time units, in this
context, are partly defined by the actual innovative task that is
being proposed or undertaken.
5. The Nature of Human Nature.
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HYPOTHESIS C5. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT PEOPLE ARE ULTIMATELY
NEUTRAL OR GOOD, AND, IN ANY CASE, ARE CAPABLE OF IMPROVEMENT.
Organizations make implicit assumptions about human nature,
both in terms of whether it is ultimately good, neutral, or evil,
and in terms of how malleable or fixed it is. If organizations
are cynical about human nature (McGregor's Theory X) they will not
encourage innovation or, worse, will mistrust innovators as having
ulterior motives. In such organizations innovative capacity often
is devoted to defeating organizational goals. Workers invent ela-
borate processes and devices to make life easier for themselves at
the expense of organizational efficiency (Argyris, 1964; McGregor,
1960; Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939).
On the other hand, if the organization holds optimistic
assumptions about human nature (McGregor's Theory Y), it will
expect people to be innovative, will encourage innovation, will
listen to new ideas, and will be more likely to trust them. At
the same time, for innovation to be encouraged organization
members must feel that they are all "perfectible" in the sense
that one's personality is not fixed. If one knows one can grow
and improve, this knowledge (assumption) acts as a powerful
stimulant to personal development and innovation.
6. The Nature of Human Relationships.
HYPOTHESIS C6A. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATIONN TO INNOVATE WILL
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INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THE IDEAL OF INDIVIDUALISM
AND THE PURSUIT OF INDIVIDUAL DIVERSITY.
HYPOTHESIS C6B. BUT, IF AN ORGANIZATION HAS A FEW INNOVATIVE
INDIVIDUALS WHOSE IDEAS ARE ADOPTED, IT CAN IMPLEMENT SOME TYPES
OF INNOVATIONS FASTER TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THE IDEAL OF
GROUPISM.
HYPOTHESIS C6C. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES THAT COLLEGIAL/PARTICIPAT-
IVE METHODS OF DECISION MAKING ARE THE MOST APPROPRIATE.
HYPOTHESIS C6D. BUT, IF AN ORGANIZATION HAS INNOVATIVE PEOPLE IN
SENIOR LEADERSHIP ROLES, IT CAN IMPLEMENT SOME INNOVATIONS FASTER
TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ASSUMES AUTHORITARIAN/PATERNALISTIC METHODS
OF DECISION MAKING.
This dimension of culture has to do with prevailing
assumptions about the ideal human relationship. Two dimensions
are involved here:
1) The degree to which the organization assumes the ideal
of "individualism" (that all good things ultimately come from
individual effort) or "groupism" (that all good things ultimately
come from the group, implying that ultimately all individuals must
subordinate themselves to the group), and,
2) The degree to which ideal relationships are seen as
collegial/participative (implying that power and influence in
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decision making is a function of who has what expertise relevant
to any given task to be accomplished) or as autocratic/paternal-
istic (implying that power and influence reside in positions,
statuses and roles, or are a function of the specific personality
of the individual).
The hypotheses around these two dimensions are more complex
and contingent because under certain conditions innovation could
occur anywhere along these two dimensions. Basically a culture
that values individuals and individual diversity will have more
ideas to draw from and create more incentives for ideas to be put
forward. However, when it comes to acceptance of ideas and imple-
mentation, the strongly individualistic organization may be at
some disadvantage. In other words, in a groupist organization it
will be harder to get new ideas to be articulated, but if they are
adopted, such an organization will be far more effective in imple-
menting them because individuals who may dissent will suppress
their dissent for the sake of the total group's welfare.
In such organizations the burden of innovation probably
falls on the leadership in that they are the most likely to be
able to get an idea adopted in the first place. What the deter-
minants are of innovativeness in the leaders of groupist organiz-
ations then becomes the secondary but critical question.
Collegial/participative decision making is more likely to
identify the relevant areas in which innovation is needed, to sur-
face good ideas, to stimulate creativity, and to produce a state
of affairs where everyone understands the idea so that it will be
properly implemented. This assumption is central because collegi-
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al/participative decision making influences so many phases of the
total innovation process from invention to implementation, partic-
ularly if the new idea or process is complex and hard to under-
stand.
If, on the other hand, an autocratic or paternalistic
leader has innovative ideas that are sound, if the ideas are not
too complex to communicate, and if the socio-technical implicat-
ions have been correctly thought through, it is possible for the
organization to implement such ideas more rapidly and totally.
The danger in this situation is threefold: 1) That the
leader will impose an idea that is wrong under conditions where
subordinates are neither motivated nor rewarded for pointing out
the potential problems; 2) That the idea will not be successfully
communicated leading to paralysis and frustration; or 3) That the
idea will be implemented incorrectly because the leader did not
discover that subordinates did not fully understand what he or she
had in mind and/or did not accept the consequences of the innova-
tion.
One additional point bearing on this assumption needs to be
brought out. If predictions about the ultimate impact of IT are
correct, then leaner, flatter, more highly networked organizations
are the likely consequence (Drucker, 1988; Malone, 1987). Such
organizations cannot work effectively, however, if their managers
are still operating from hierarchical models buttressed by auto-
cratic or paternalistic assumptions (Schein, 1989). The basis of
authority in such networks will more likely be the degree of skill
or expertise that any given member has at any given moment in time
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relative to the task to be done. Positional authority will mean
very little. Obviously such systems will function better if they
hold collegial/participative assumptions in the first place.
7. Sub-cultural Diversity.
HYPOTHESIS C7. THE CAPACITY OF AN ORGANIZATION TO INNOVATE WILL
INCREASE TO THE EXTENT THAT IT ENCOURAGES DIVERSE BUT CONNECTED
SUB-CULTURES.
As organizations grow and mature they develop sub-cultures
as well as overarching cultures. The nature and diversity of such
sub-cultures will influence the organization's innovative capaci-
ty. For any given group, culture is a homogenizing force. How-
ever, if the organization contains within its total system, enough
diverse sub-systems with their own diverse sub-cultures, it can
manage to innovate by empowering people and ideas from those
sub-cultures that are most different from the "parent" yet best
adapted to a changing environment. Drawing on diverse sub-cult-
ures is, in fact, the commonest way that cultures evolve, and this
process, if properly managed, is therefore one of the most
important sources of potential innovation.
The sub-cultures must be connected and part of a parent
culture or their elements will not be seen as relevant when intro-
duced into the parent. For example, in a highly geographically
decentralized organization new ideas may well spring up in an
overseas subsidiary, but those ideas are only importable into the
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parent organization if the subsidiary is perceived to be genuinely
part of the larger culture. If the ideas are brought in via
transfer of people from the subsidiary, those people will only
have credibility and influence if they are perceived to be part of
the larger culture and sympathetic to it.
It is this diversity within unity theme that accounts for
so many current management statements that the effective organiza-
tion is one that can both centralize and decentralize, that can be
loose and tight at the same time. To restate the point, diversi-
fication and decentralization are effective as innovative forces
only to the extent that the separate units are perceived to be and
feel themselves to be connected to the whole. If they do not feel
connected they will not be motivated to innovate on behalf of the
whole. If they are not perceived to be connected, their ideas
will not be perceived as relevant.
Summary.
To summarize, in order to be innovative an organizational
culture must assume:
1) That the world is changeable and can be managed,
2) That humans are by nature proactive problem solvers,
3) That truth is pragmatically arrivedat,
4) That the appropriate time horizon is near future,
5) That time units should be geared to the kind of
innovation being considered,
6) That human nature is neutral or good and is, in any
case, perfectible,
3_ 11____ __11_____1__^_1_1ll_ -_-_---
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7) That human relationships are based on individualism
and the valuing of diversity,
8) That decision making is collegial/participative,
9) That diverse sub-cultures are an asset to be
encouraged, but that sub-cultures have to be
connected to the parent culture.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGIST.
Culture will become an increasingly important concept for
organizational psychology. Without such a concept we cannot
really understand change or resistance to change. The more we get
involved with helping organizations to design their fundamental
strategy, particularly in the human resource area, the more
important it will be to be able to help organizations to decipher
their own culture.
All of the activities that revolve around recruitment,
selection, training, socialization, the design of reward systems,
the design and description of jobs, and broader issues of organi-
zation design cannot be properly carried out without understanding
how organizational cultures influence present functioning. Many
of the failures of programs designed by psychologists are probably
the result of ignoring cultural forces in the organization in
which they were to be installed.
Culture does not require a whole new technology of measure-
ment and action skills. Rather, if one is clear about it concept-
ually, and if one is willing to use interviews and observation,
one can decipher most of what one needs to know. The only danger
-44-
I see in this area is the assumption that culture can be measured
and quantified, leading to the premature design of culture
diagnostic instruments, and the application of such instruments in
situations that may not be appropriate at all.
We must give culture its due. And that will mean that the
organizational psychologist must function as a clinician, ethno-
grapher, and historian in helping organizations to decipher their
own culture as they need to do this. The data thus revealed will
be of most use to all of us as students of culture.
__I______I___P__I__1__1-111_-_
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